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Abstract
Popocatépetl Volcano, located in the central Trans-Mexican Volcanic
Belt, is surrounded by a densely populated region with more than 20
million people. During the past 23,000 years, this volcano has produced
eruptions ranging widely in size and style, including Plinian events and
massive sector collapses. However, the historical activity of Popocatépetl,
recorded in detail since 1500, consists of only nineteen small to moderate
eruptions, several similar in style to the current eruptive episode
(1994-present). After nearly 70 years of quiescence since its eruptions
in the mid-1920s, Popocatépetl reawakened in December 21, 1994. This
eruptive activity, which is still ongoing, has been characterized by a
succession of lava dome growth-and-destruction episodes: pulses of
effusive and moderately explosive activity alternating with periods of
almost total quiescence. This pattern appears to be characteristic of all
historical eruptions, several of which lasted for decades, with interspersed
lull periods that in some cases make it difﬁcult to identify the end of the
eruptive episodes. In this chapter, we discuss the problems and challenges
posed by a prolonged, low-level volcanic crisis (or “semi-crisis”) of
variable intensity that has lasted for more than 20 years, without showing
any signs of coming to an end. Paradoxically, this still-continuing crisis
has spawned two opposite developments: (1) during periods of little
visible activity, people dwelling near the volcano become somewhat
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apathetic and indifferent; but (2) during times of easily observed visible
activity, awareness of changes at the volcano—and their hazardous
implications—is rapidly and greatly enhanced by the common use of
social media by people.
1 Introduction
Disasters can occur when society fails to identify
and foresee the potentially hazardous manifesta-
tions of a natural phenomenon. However, disas-
ters may also occur if society fails to adopt
adequate measures to reduce the risks—to peo-
ple, property, and infrastructure—posed by haz-
ardous phenomena even if recognized in
advance. Responding effectively to hazards is a
process as complex as is the fabric of society
itself, as each hazardous phenomenon has a
variety of destructive manifestations, and each
may affect different sectors of society in partic-
ular ways. This is especially true when dealing
with volcanic crises. As has been long recog-
nized (e.g., Fiske 1984; Peterson 1986, 1988;
Tilling 1989; Voight 1990; Peterson and Tilling
1993; Haynes et al. 2008; Solana et al. 2008;
Fearnley 2013), the process of crisis response
entails close interaction between three main
entities: (1) The scientists studying the hazardous
phenomena and their potential social outcomes;
(2) the authorities in charge of public safety and
infrastructure; and (3) the affected populace. The
wide spectrum of backgrounds and attitudes of
all the involved stakeholders during such inter-
action, together with the vague or imprecise
information generally available during the crisis,
often combine to hinder effective communica-
tions among the entities involved. Poor commu-
nications in turn complicate the perception of the
risk, a factor likely to increase societal vulnera-
bility. Thus, during an evolving crisis, it is crit-
ical to develop a perception of risk as uniform as
possible among all stakeholders—no easy task
when the affected population is measured in
millions. To achieve this goal requires searching
for communication tools that can describe—as
simply as possible—the relations between the
level of threat posed by the volcano, and the level
of response of the authorities and the affected
public. In the case of Popocatépetl, the Civil
Protection of Mexico addressed this challenge by
developing and implementing the Volcanic
Trafﬁc Light Alert System (VTLAS). Distinct
from other volcano alert systems (VALs)—typi-
cally referenced to the activity of the volcano—
used to communicate warning information from
scientists to civil authorities managing volcanic
hazards (Fearnley 2013; Potter et al. 2014), the
VTLAS scheme (discussed in detail below)
additionally was intended to reduce the possi-
bility of ambiguous interpretations of intermedi-
ate alert levels by the large populations at risk.
This additional component marks a signiﬁcant
advance in the management of volcanic crises in
Mexico (De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling 2008).
Before proceeding further, we should sum-
marize how risk is managed by the National Civil
Protection System of México (SINAPROC),
which was created in 1986 after the catastrophic
disaster caused by a M 8.1 earthquake on
September 19, 1985. The executive body of the
SINAPROC at the federal level is the General
Coordination, housed within the Ministry of the
Interior (Secretaría de Gobernación). The Gen-
eral Coordination is supported by four agencies:
(1) the National Direction of Civil Protection, an
operational body in charge of implementing the
preventive and relief actions; (2) the General
Direction of Integral Risk Management, which
provides the funding for prevention and emer-
gency actions; (3) the General Direction of
Interlinking and Regulations, which coordinates
the different government levels involved with
civil protection; and (4) the National Center for
Disaster Prevention (CENAPRED), a technical
2 S. De la Cruz-Reyna et al.
body created in September 19, 1988, with sub-
stantial technical and generous ﬁnancial support
from the government of Japan. The mission of
CENAPRED is to promote the applications of
science and technology for the prevention and
mitigation of disasters, to train and inform pro-
fessionals and technicians on these subjects, and
to disseminate the necessary information for
preparedness and self-protection.
CENAPRED also acts as an active interface
between the operative, decision-making authori-
ties of the SINAPROC and the academic scien-
tiﬁc community. In conducting its work,
CENAPRED utilizes four advisory scientiﬁc
committees on topics relevant for disaster pre-
vention, composed of prominent, experienced
Mexican scientists in the areas of Earth sciences,
hydro-meteorological sciences, social sciences,
and chemical and industrial hazards. There are
also ad-hoc sub-committees, as is the case of the
Advisory Committee for Popocatépetl Volcano,
on which several international volcanologists—
especially from the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS)—have actively participated. This advi-
sory sub-committee will be herein referred as the
Popocatépetl Scientiﬁc Committee (PSC).
Popocatépetl has remained persistently active
for over 20 years, thereby creating a
long-standing volcanic crisis that has imposed
additional difﬁculties in the management of the
volcanic risk. CENAPRED has been and remains
in charge of the monitoring of Popocatépetl
volcano, and it also continues to host and coor-
dinate PSC sessions as needed.
2 Popocatépetl Volcano: Geologic
Setting and Eruptive History
Popocatépetl Volcano (19.02°N, 98.62°W),
which lies within the central Trans-Mexican
Volcanic Belt (Fig. 1), is located about 60 km
SE of México City and 45 km W of Puebla City.
These two populations centers, combined with
other nearby cities within a 100-km radius
around the volcano, contain a total population of
Fig. 1 Sketch map showing the location of Popocatépetl
Volcano and other historically active volcanoes of
Mexico: 1 Tres Vírgenes; 2 Evermann (Socorro); 3
Ceboruco; 4 Colima; 5 Parícutin; 6 Xitle; 7 Popocatépetl;
8 Pico de Orizaba (Citlaltépetl); 9 San Martín Tuxtla;
10 El Chichón; 11 Tacaná. The inset shows the distribu-
tion of cities and major towns (yellow) within 100 km of
Popocatépetl’s active crater. The cities of Mexico City,
Puebla, Cuernavaca, Cuautla and others located within the
inset have a combined population over 20 million
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over 20 million people. Rising 5454 meters
above sea level, the conical volcanic ediﬁce of
Popocatépetl is topped by a 600  800 m ellip-
tical summit crater. Popocatépetl is the youngest
peak within the Sierra Nevada, a volcanic
mountain range which extends in a roughly N–S
direction. To the north of Popocatépetl, the vol-
canic complex Iztaccíhuatl complements the
iconic volcanic landscape of the region (Fig. 2).
Geological evidence indicates that a large
eruption about 23,000 years destroyed a
pre-existing volcanic ediﬁce, generating massive
debris avalanches (Robin and Boudal 1987;
Boudal and Robin 1989; Siebe et al. 1995). Since
then, Popocatépetl’s eruptive history has been
characterized by at least seven major explosive
eruptions and many smaller eruptions that have
produced large volumes of ash and pumice. Three
of themost recent explosive eruptions (ca. 3000 B.
C., between 800 and 200 B.C., and ca. A.D. 800)
affected human settlements, as indicated by
archaeological remains buried by ashfall deposits
and pottery shards incorporated by mudflows
(Siebe et al. 1996; Siebe and Macías 2004). After
the last of these major eruptions, activity at
Popocatépetl has remained moderate for nearly
1200 years. Batches of magma were extruded,
producing lava domes and associated moderate
explosions and ashfalls. Eyewitness reports since
1354 (in the native Nahuatl and Spanish language
translations) describe episodes of activity, while
more recent and detailed written reports since
1500 document that about 16 small and 3moderate
eruptive episodes have occurred within the past
500 years, some of them probably involving dome
growth-and-destruction processes similar to those
Fig. 2 Popocatépetl (right) and Iztaccíhuatl Volcanoes:
Above, “Camino a Chalco con los volcanes” painting by
José María Velasco, 1891 (Museo Nacional de Arte,
MUNAL, Mexico). Below, view of these two prominent
peaks through helicopter windshield (Photograph by S.
De la Cruz-Reyna in September 2002)
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of the current, ongoing activity (De la Cruz-Reyna
et al. 1995; De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling 2008).
3 Ongoing Unrest, Eruptive
Activity, and Volcanic Crisis
Management of risk posed by volcanic unrest
requires a comprehensive understanding of the
natural phenomenon. In this regard, a sustained
activity makes it particularly difﬁcult to forecast
the future activity and its consequences, because
the commonly employed methodologies to rec-
ognize and assess the relevance of precursors of
increased activity are obscured by the persistent
low-to-medium level of activity. It is thus
important to deﬁne and establish the context of
the unrest to develop decision-making criteria.
Before the current activity, there was little
public awareness outside the scientiﬁc community
about Popocatépetl being an active and potentially
hazardous volcano. The previous eruption of
Popocatépetl was not a major event. It began in
1919, and the available descriptions of that
activity (Friedländer 1921; Waitz 1921; Dr. Atl
1939) indicate that it consisted of a succession of
dome emplacements and destructions, similar to
the current eruptive episode, probably lasting until
1927. Then, after nearly 70 years of quiescence
(except for a minor fumarolic event in 1947),
Popocatépetl volcano reawakened in 1993 with
increased fumarolic and seismic activity (De la
Cruz-Reyna et al. 2008). By October 1994, this
unrest further escalated, culminating with a series
of moderately large phreatic explosions at the
crater during the early hours of 21 December
1994. These explosions produced ashfalls on
several towns to the east and northeast of the
volcano, including the large city of Puebla.
At the time of the explosions, glaciers with an
estimated total area of 0.54 km2 blanketed the
northern flank of the cone, below the crater
(Delgado-Granados 1997; Huggel and
Delgado-Granados 2000). With the vivid mem-
ories of the 1985 Nevado del Ruiz disaster in the
minds of authorities and scientists, nearly 25,000
people living in some of the most vulnerable
towns located along the likely paths of pyro-
clastic flows and lahars were evacuated in the
afternoon of 21 December as a precautionary
measure. A week later, the eruptive activity
decreased and its largely phreatic nature became
better understood, the evacuated residents were
allowed to return home. Ash emissions or pro-
tracted explosions consisting mostly of gas and
steam with relatively low concentrations of ash
and a characteristic emerging seismic signal were
referred to as “exhalations.” This type of rela-
tively low-level activity persisted through 1995
and into early 1996, with decreasing intensity
(De la Cruz-Reyna and Siebe 1997).
About a year later, seismicity and exhalation
activity increased again, and on 26 March 1996 a
lava dome was ﬁrst observed growing on the
crater floor. This dome was partially destroyed
by an explosion on April 30, 1996, which pro-
pelled ejecta several kilometers into the sky and
hot debris as far as 4 km and caused the only
reported fatalities to date directly related to the
Popocatépetl activity. Despite public warnings
not to enter the 12 km-radius restricted area
around the mountain, ﬁve members of a sports
club climbed to the summit crater rim to obtain
good images and videos of the activity. These
climbers were struck and killed by incandescent
fragments during their descent, a few hundreds of
meters downslope from the crater, as evidenced
by the images recovered from their cameras.
Dome-building activity resumed mid-March
1997 (GVN 1996, 1998). These 1996–1997
events marked the beginning of a series of dome
growth-and-destruction cycles that have contin-
ued up until this writing. Although most of the
explosions have been moderate, some of them
have been large enough to produce pyroclastic
flows (in 2001) and lahars (in 1997 and 2001;
Capra et al. 2004).
In summary, the current eruptive episode to
date has consisted of a succession of
moderate-size eruptions, characteristic of Popo-
catépetl’s activity since the 14th century (De la
Cruz-Reyna et al. 1995). Nonetheless, given the
huge population in the region potentially at risk,
together with concerns about possible escalation
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of the ongoing eruptive activity to Plinian pha-
ses, or even worse a major sector collapse, the
management of the “volcanic crisis” at Popoca-
tépetl—already persisting for 20-plus years—
remains a major challenge for volcanologists,
national and local Civil Protection authorities,
and the threatened populations (De la
Cruz-Reyna and Siebe 1997). From experience
gained through 1997, involved scientists and
decision-making authorities became increasingly
convinced of the need to attain a more appro-
priate and uniform perception of the changing
risk among all the stakeholders. Accordingly, in
1998 the Volcanic Trafﬁc Light Alert System
(VTLAS) was developed as a risk- communica-
tion protocol, hazards-warning system and
response scheme speciﬁcally designed to manage
the ongoing volcanic crisis at Popocatépetl more
effectively (Fig. 3). A detailed description of
VTLAS and its use are given by De la
Cruz-Reyna and Tilling (2008), but we summa-
rize below three salient points:
1. A level of activity of the volcano is deﬁned
by the PSC and translated into the most likely
scenarios, describing them in speciﬁc terms,
including time scales, names of threatened
areas, etc. In general terms, these sets of
scenarios may be grouped according to seven
levels of response of the SINAPROC, which
in turn are managed as phases within each of
the Trafﬁc light colors: two for Green, three
for Yellow, and two for Red.
2. SINAPROC authorities translate the level of
volcanic hazard deﬁned by the PSC into one
of three alert levels for the population (not of
the volcano) that leave no room for uncer-
tainty: Green, everything is ﬁne; Yellow, you
must be aware of the hazard and pay attention
to any ofﬁcial announcements; and Red, you
must leave the area according to the instruc-
tions given by the authorities.
3. All decisions involving mitigative actions are
undertaken by the Civil Protection authorities
according to the selected phase within the
color level. It is important to emphasize that,
in Mexico, the management of risks associ-
ated to natural phenomena is by law a
responsibility assumed by the three levels of
government: federal, state, and municipal.
The Scientiﬁc Committees are ofﬁcially
appointed advisory groups of “more than 10
but less than 15 experts in the subject, which
can emit opinions and recommendations
about the origin, evolution and consequences
of hazardous phenomena, aimed to techni-
cally induce decision making for prevention
and mitigation to the population…”, as stated
by the Organization and Operation Manual of
the National System of Civil Protection
within the General Law of Civil Protection.
4 Evolution of the Activity
Influences Public Perception
of Hazards
Popocatépetl’s historical volcanic activity has
been dominated by an irregular, yet sustained
dome-emplacement and destruction processes,
which in turn have resulted in some signiﬁcant
fluctuations in the level of the summit crater
floor. The floor, which was about 277 m deep in
1906 (Friedländer 1921), was raised almost 100
meters because of the accumulation of
dome-forming products during the 1919–1927
eruptive episode (Gómez-Vázquez et al. 2016)
The episode beginning in 1994 further accumu-
lated enough material to raise the level of the
crater floor to near the crater rim after the peak of
activity in 2000–2001, thereby reducing the
capacity of the crater walls to contain or reduce
the range of potential pyroclastic flows. In fact,
under these conditions an explosion occurring on
January 22, 2001 produced pyroclastic flows that
traveled about 4.5 km from the crater, affecting
the glacier on its northeast slopes and triggering a
lahar that reached the outer limits of Xalitzintla,
one of the nearest villages (Sheridan et al. 2001;
Capra et al. 2004; Macías and Siebe 2005).
However, the general level of activity, as mea-
sured by exhalation-explosion events and
dome-emplacement rates, signiﬁcantly decreased
after 2003, as the rate of dome destruction
exceeded the rate of lava emplacement, causing
6 S. De la Cruz-Reyna et al.
some reversals in the rate of volcanic material
accumulation within the crater, and a signiﬁcant
increase of its maximum depth (Gómez-Vázquez
et al. 2016). As of March 2015, the summit
crater was again reﬁlling with volcanic debris
(Fig. 4), but so far, no other pyroclastic flows
have been observed.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of seismicity
during the period 1996–2014, as indicated by the
fluctuations in total seismic energy release, a
basic volcano-monitoring parameter expressed
by RSAM values and their cumulative curve.
RSAM (Real-time Seismic Amplitude Measure-
ment) is a system that continuously samples the
Fig. 3 A poster designed for
public ofﬁces showing the
VTLAS
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absolute amplitude of the seismometer signals
(Murray and Endo 1989; Endo and Murray
1991). From RSAM data, the cumulative seismic
energy released by the volcano provides a very
good proxy of its vigor of eruptive activity, as it
reflects the total seismic energy release from all
sources: VTs, explosions, exhalations, tremors,
etc. Figure 5 exhibits that the overall level of
activity varied little between 1996 and early
2000, with a weak increasing trend from the
onset of the activity before sharply increasing in
late 2000 and the start of 2001. Afterwards, the
level of activity gradually decreased keeping a
relatively low level until a new marked increase
in RSAM counts in mid-2010. During the period
2003–2010, however, far fewer reports of visible
volcanic manifestations—such as observed
explosions, exhalations or lava accumulation—
induced many people to believe that the eruptive
activity perhaps was approaching its end, despite
the seismic-monitoring data indicating otherwise.
Expectedly, public interest in the volcano waned
and perception of its hazards slowly started to
dissipate. Yet, volcano monitoring and the
Fig. 4 View of
Popocatépetl’s summit crater
on 3 March 2015 showing
that volcanic materials ﬁlling
the crater had reached within





about the state of the volcano,
this photograph was taken by
a member of a group of
adolescents who had climbed
the summit area without
authorization (see text for
further discussion)
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information about the volcano activity were
never scaled down, as the daily reports on the
volcano condition and the status of the VTLAS,
which remained in Yellow, were published every
day by CENAPRED in its website. Nevertheless,
only when activity manifestations such as
explosions, exhalations or persistent fumaroles
become visible, the media massively reproduces
such reports. The proliferation of social networks
and ﬁxed webcam sites, such as http://www.
webcamsdemexico.com/ (with more than half a
million followers), has made possible wide dis-
semination of information about the occurrences
of even minor events, thereby improving in this
way the persistence of awareness.
5 Development of Risk—Mitigation
Strategies Since 1994
Perhaps the main challenge in managing the
response to the ongoing volcanic activity of
Popocatépetl has been posed by its rather pedes-
trian, anti-climactic character, particularly during
the 2003–2010 period. The initially impressive
phreatic eruption of 1994 that sharply contrasted
with the quietness of the previous 70 years
prompted the frenzied making of a Popocatépetl’s
volcanic hazards map (Macías et al. 1995) in only
a few months under high-stress conditions. This
map—the ﬁrst such for Popocatépetl speciﬁcally
Fig. 5 Evolution of seismicity during the period 1996–
2015, as recorded by the Chiquipixtle seismic station
(PPX), located to the WSW of the crater, at a height of
3980 m. asl. Above, each vertical bar represents a
ten-minute RSAM average of the seismic signal ampli-
tude sampled at a rate of 100 samples per second. Below,
cumulative RSEM (sum of successive squared RSAM
values, proportional to the total seismic energy detected
by the monitoring station). In December 2000, the activity
increased sharply, including recorded manifestations such
as saturating harmonic tremors (see Fig. 6). This surge in
seismic activity prompted a precautionary evacuation of
towns exposed to pyroclastic and lahar flows. The seismic
energy release since 2010 has been actually larger, but at a
lower rates. The inset in the center shows a zoom of the
waning RSEM in the period 2001–2010
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intended for use by civil authorities—was made
with a general consensus of the involved Mexican
and U.S. experts. The high-urgency 1994–95
scientiﬁc and governmental response, which also
included the development of the VTLAS, then
gradually declined until the onset of effusive
magmatic activity in 1996. The VTLAS was set at
Yellow for the population at the moment of its
implementation in mid-1995. The slow decline of
the ash–emission events, the direct source of
public and authority awareness, was not much in
agreement with the data from the
volcano-monitoring instruments. The VTLAS
thus remained in Yellow even when the volcano
appeared to be in a relative state of rest. News
media and the public started to joke about a
“busted” trafﬁc light. However, in March 1996,
the emplacement of the ﬁrst lava dome conﬁrmed
an ongoing level of eruptive activity, and thereby
rekindled public and media interest and concern.
Unlike the initial 1994 episode, the now
much-improved monitoring data allowed a better
understanding of the 1996 activity. Because the
character of the dome -emplacement processes
was effusive and conﬁned within the summit
crater, the PSC continued to recommend main-
taining the VTLAS in Yellow, as the probabilities
of pyroclastic flows or lahars were still low. It was
at that time that some members of a sport clubs
climbed to the crater rim. Tragically, this impru-
dent action resulted in the above-mentioned
casualties caused by the ﬁrst dome-destruction
explosion, again rekindling the interest of public
and media.
Dome-emplacement and destruction activity
continued in the ensuing years with a somewhat
increasing trend, but without exceeding the levels
set by the scenarios marked by the VTLAS, so it
continued in condition Yellow. However, the
dome-destruction explosions in 1997, and par-
ticularly the 13 km-high ash column of 30 June
that caused ashfalls in Mexico City and impelled
closing its airport for 12 h, prompted changing
the VTLAS to Red for a few hours. However, no
evacuations of populations were ordered, thereby
generating some confusion among people and
authorities. Studies at other volcanoes (Solana
et al. 2008) indicate that, although civil
authorities are aware of the volcanic hazards,
their understanding of how to respond during an
emergency can be incomplete, and that under-
standing how people perceive risk is important
for improving risk communication and reducing
risk-associated conflicts (Haynes et al. 2008).
At this stage, the need of an embedded scale
within the three-color alert levels designating the
alert level of authorities became immediately
evident; see De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling (2008)
for a detailed account of the VTLAS levels. The
quick return to condition Yellow, as no evacua-
tions were needed, again prompted the news
media and public to joke about a “busted” trafﬁc
light. Public discussions on this subject, how-
ever, ultimately proved to be beneﬁcial, because
it helped to convey to the general public and
many authorities that the color of the Trafﬁc
Light is not a description of the state of the
volcano, but rather it is a description of the threat
on people and thus reflects the state of awareness
of individuals. Hence, the VTLAS remained in
Yellow, although the phase, i.e., the level of alert
for Civil Protection authorities, has changed
several times.
The VTLAS was only temporarily set again in
condition Red at the peak of intensity (i.e., rate of
seismic energy release) of the entire eruptive epi-
sode during December 15–19, 2000. Unlike the
1997 event, the management of the December
2000 eruption was more efﬁcient as lessons were
learned from the 1997 experience. The colors and
phases of the VTLAS, and a safety radius of
12 km around the crater, were then clearly deﬁned
by the PSC. This radius narrowly excluded the
closest towns to the volcano. The Red-VTLAS
was set on the basis of a 24-h forecast made by the
PSC from the large amplitude of the volcanic
tremor signals, and using results from a
load-and-discharge time-predictable model con-
sisting of a succession of episodes of variable
intensity, in which the seismic energy released by
a high intensity episode of activity is followed by a
lower-intensity period with a duration propor-
tional to the previous energy drop (see for example
De la Cruz-Reyna 1991). The exclusion radius
was then extended to 13 km, and an evacuation of
the towns within that radius was undertaken
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(Fig. 6). This precautionary action was taken
because the dome-destroying eruptions ejected
large amounts of hot debris onto the glacial ice that
could induce localized melting, such that even
minor pyroclastic flows could produce powerful
lahars. One of the vexing difﬁculties in the man-
agement of the December 2000 response was a
marked overreaction of authorities in some small
towns slightly beyond the exclusion radius. Con-
cerned that some nearby towns were being evac-
uated, these ofﬁcials decided to order immediate
evacuations, without waiting for conﬁrmation of
the National Security Committee. No criteria for
the return of these people to their homes were
deﬁned at the time, and some evacuees remained
up to 10 days in temporary shelters. The problems
of overreaction and the lack of clear “return” cri-
teria to lower the level of alert have not yet been
solved (De la Cruz-Reyna et al. 2000).
The December 2000–January 2001 explosive
activity marked a watershed in the evolution of the
ongoing volcanic crisis at Popocatépetl. Before
2001, the accumulation rate of dome lavas and
debris exceeded the rate of removal by explosive
activity. After a period of irregular activity lasting
until 2003, that trend slowly reversed, and the
main crater slowly began to recover some of its
former capacity (Gómez-Vázquez et al. 2016).
After 2003, a lower lava emplacement and
explosion rates (shown as a diminishing slope of
the cumulative RSEMcounts in the inset of Fig. 5)
prompted a reduction of the VTLAS phase from
Y-3 to Y-2, and then to Y-1 in 2004, still main-
taining however condition Yellow on affected
populations. The slightly increased seismic activ-
ity in late 2005 and 2006 raised the VTLAS phase
back to Y-2. Overall, between 2005 and 2009, the
rate of dome-lava growth did not exceed the rate of
debris removal by explosions and exhalations, so
that the crater continued to deepen slightly.
Explosive activity gradually increased again in
mid-2010 and continued with minor fluctuations
through 2011. On 20 November 2011, a powerful
explosion ejected large ballistic blocks to dis-
tances of 4 km; this explosion also generated a
shock wave that was felt by some people as far
away as 10 km from the volcano, but luckily with
no damaging consequences.
Fig. 6 Left Seismograms of the December 2000 activity
(back), showing highly saturated recordings, compared
with seismicity recorded for the largest previous eruptive
event in June 1997 (front), which caused ashfall on
Mexico City, obtained from the same CENAPRED
monitoring station. Right Images of the evacuation and
of evacuees watching the eruption from a safe distance
(photographs courtesy of Associated Press)
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Since 2001, dome building, exhalations, and
explosions have continued sporadically to the
date of this writing (July 2016). Accordingly, this
persistent, though irregular, activity has necessi-
tated that the VTLAS remains for long times in
condition Yellow, leading to some wearisome-
ness and complacency among the populace and
some municipal authorities of towns near the
volcano during protracted lull periods. However,
no complacency existed among authorities at the
federal level. During periods of relative inactiv-
ity, the PSC and the CP authorities discussed in
depth the pros and cons of making the VTLAS
more dynamic, particularly lowering it to Green
during relative quiescences. However, after much
debate, a strong argument ﬁnally gained con-
sensus: Green conditions would immediately
allow the occupation and/or reoccupation of
previously restricted areas close to the limit of
the National Park, and well within the exclusion
radius of 11 km. Then, should a new episode of
more intense explosive activity arise, it would be
much more difﬁcult to evacuate people than it
would be had the VTLAS remained in Yellow.
Thus, it was decided to retain the current proto-
cols, until there was solid evidence that the now
two-decade-long eruptive episode had com-
pletely ﬁnished and the volcano had re-entered
another long repose period.
The continuing, persistent moderate level
activity of the volcano, together with the need to
keep an intermediate level of alert among people
and authorities, has generated an awkward situ-
ation that may well be called a “semi-crisis,”
which appears to be taken less seriously than a
full-blown crisis among authorities and commu-
nities surrounding the volcano. The ambivalence
of how this “semi-crisis” is viewed may be
gleaned from the results of a telephone survey
conducted in April 2012. Of the 800 people
surveyed, 49% greatly feared the volcanic
activity, 23% were worried about the “situation”,
but the remaining 28% had little or no fear, or
had no opinion (Fig. 7). Of continuing concern
to the authorities, some people clearly do not
perceive the volcano as a risk, as evidenced, for
example, by the actions of a group of adolescents
in March 2015. This group—numbering about
15 and all under the age of 18—had climbed to
Popocatépetl’s summit crater ﬁve times, against
government restrictions and apparently oblivious
to dangers from possible volcanic activity during
their ascents (https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=higZ7j98Og8).
6 Scientific Strategies and Scientific
Challenges
The main function of the Popocatépetl Scientiﬁc
Committee (PSC) is to assess the hazards related
to the activity of Popocatépetl volcano. From its
earliest sessions in 1995, a methodology that
proved to be efﬁcient and practical was adopted.
Fig. 7 The results of a
telephone survey of 800
people, conducted on 19 April
2012, to gauge the general
public’s perceptions of the
ongoing, but generally low
level, activity of Popocatépetl.
(Image from http://
kaleydoscopio.mx/)
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Sessions are chaired by a moderator, usually the
director of CENAPRED, or a high authority from
the National Autonomous University of Mexico
(UNAM) or from the Ministry or Interior, and
usually limited to 2 h, unless a special situation
requires more time. The sessions are split into
three parts. In the initial one, the monitoring
groups describe the recent observations, always
in the same order: seismic, geodetic, visual,
geochemical, and others (Fig. 8). Questions are
allowed, but no discussions are permitted until
the exposition of all the data is complete. In the
second part, the members of the PSC discuss the
observations and propose possible explanations
of the observed data. This discussion is steered
towards interpretations for which consensus
seem to exist. Non-consensual matters are set
aside to be discussed later elsewhere. In the third
part, the PSC proposes the most likely scenarios
based on the consensus of the previous discus-
sions. When a small number of likely scenarios is
agreed upon, the PSC summarizes the likely
scenarios and makes recommendations to the
Civil Protection (CP) authority based on all
previous deliberations. This method, which is
similar to the differential diagnosis used in
medical science, has proved effective to make
diagnostics and prognostics of the volcano
activity, and to present them to CP as a list of the
possible scenarios in a descending order of
likelihood. We re-emphasize that the PSC does
not set the level of the VTLAS, which is done by
the CP authorities based on the PSC
recommendations.
The main difﬁculties faced by the scientists of
the PSC may be summarized in two different
realms: ﬁrstly, the scientiﬁc and technical one
related to understanding of volcanic processes
and, secondly, the operational aspects in effec-
tively communicating hazards information to the
CP authorities, news media, and the affected
populace. With regard to the former, apart from
the typical instrumental and technological inad-
equacies and limitations in the amount and
Fig. 8 A session of the PSC in progress in 2014, at
which the relevance of changes in seismic spectrograms
related to observed visible signs of volcanic activity is
being discussed. The inset shows a session in 2015 at
which the main subject was the policies to deal with
people disregarding the security radius to climb Popoca-
tépetl Volcano. All sessions of the PSC are recorded
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quality of monitoring data, an important issue has
been the evolution of the precursors’ meaning
and possible implications. Speciﬁcally, what do
the variations in precursory activity portend what
the volcano might do next? During the initial
years of the crisis at Popocatépetl, acquired
experience allowed identiﬁcation of clear pre-
cursors to explosions, such as harmonic tremors;
repetitive short-duration, low-amplitude LP
events (drumbeats); accelerated rate of RSAM
counts, etc. However, and with no clear water-
shed (although it may be related to the change of
eruptive regime in 2001–2003), in several
instances such seismic signals were not neces-
sarily followed by explosions. On the other hand,
cumulative volcano-tectonic (VT) energy release,
rate of dome growth, and VT appearing in
speciﬁc locations seemed to have become more
relevant precursors.
With regard to effective communications of
hazards information, in addition to the general
factors considered previously discussed, an
additional recurrent hindrance during the Popo-
catépetl crisis has been the frequent changes of
decision-making authorities over time scales
shorter than the duration of the volcanic activity.
Federal and state governments change every
6 years, so that within each period of adminis-
tration the responsible CP authorities with whom
the scientists interact may be replaced more than
once. Thus, it is always necessary to train the
new authorities in the communication process.
Fortunately, in all cases, the communication of
volcanic risk based on likely scenarios has made
it possible to deal with this problem relatively
easily.
Although the basic tools for scientiﬁc assess-
ment of the hazards and systematic monitoring of
the activity have not always been sufﬁcient,
CENAPRED has made, and is making, a major
effort in maintaining the highest technological
standards in the volcano-monitoring networks. In
addition, a new volcanic-hazards map by a team
of volcanologists at the Instituto de Geofísica,
and other UNAM institutes has replaced the
current one (Macías et al. 1995), which was
prepared under rushed conditions with minimal
data available at the time. The new hazards map
considers a wealth of new geological information
collated over the past 2 decades (in particular,
extent of lahar inundation areas, magnitude and
timing of past Plinian eruptions, ash dispersal
data, etc.). The updated hazards map and
assessment were released by CENAPRED in
(2016). Participants in the current map include
some of the authors of the 1995 map: Siebe,
Macías, Capra, Delgado, and Martin del Pozzo,
plus their associates (e.g., postdocs, students).
The CP system provided a special fund
(FOPREDEN. Disaster Prevention Fund) to ﬁn-
ish the new map, although much of the new
scientiﬁc data were obtained with research pro-
jects ﬁnanced by CONACYT (Mexican National
Science Council) and DGAPA (The UNAM fund
to support major research projects).
7 Concluding Remarks and Future
Challenges
The historical activity of Popocatépetl has been
characterized by eruptive episodes of activity
similar to the current one (1994-present). The
relatively low magnitudes of the eruptions repor-
ted since the year 1500 have not left enough geo-
logical evidence to assess their evolution with
time. Nonetheless, historical accounts (detailed in
De la Cruz-Reyna et al. 1995, and summarized in
De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling 2008) suggest that
the described events may correspond to the most
visible manifestations (i.e., dome-destruction
explosions) within long-duration episodes of
successive dome emplacement and destruction.
Without further evidence other than the general,
and sometimes vague, wording of the reports, the
events listed in De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling
(2008) may be grouped into about six of such
episodes, as shown in Table 1.
No statistical analysis of Table 1 is attempted
because of the subjective grouping of episodes.
However, some hints may be gleaned from the
inspection of the information summarized in the
table. The current eruptive episode is not
anomalously long, and within the range of
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durations of previous historical episodes. More-
over, the expected lapse to a future episode does
not seem to be correlated with the duration of the
previous episode or the duration of the previous
lapse. Unfortunately, the historical information
precludes any reliable means to forecast the
precise time and explosivity of the next eruptive
episode after the current one ends. The possi-
bility that the next episode could involve a
destructive Plinian phase cannot be ruled out;
Plinian eruptions have occurred in the geologic
past, with a mean return period of about
1500 years (Siebe et al 1996; Mendoza-Rosas
and De la Cruz-Reyna 2008). A formidable
challenge for scientists and the civil authorities in
anticipating Popocatépetl’s future behavior is to
address this question: if the current already-long
episode continues as a semi-crisis for a lot more
time, what are the best options to counteract the
wearisomeness and indifference of some of the
stakeholders? There are no easy answers.
Suggestions have been made to replace the
VTLAS by another alert system. Apart from the
confusion that a new, untested system may
induce in the large population involved, it may
not help necessarily solve the problem, as the
dullness of the situation is not caused by the alert
system, but instead by the pauses characterized
by the absence of major explosions or any other
visible expressions of increased volcanic vigor.
A positive aspect is that when a highly visible
event such as a moderate explosion occurs on a
clear day, the public’s volcano awareness seems
to recover almost instantly, as has been the case
since 2011. Figure 9 illustrates the positive
reaction of the news media and the CP prepara-
tions in response to a raise in the alert level of the
VTLAS to Yellow Phase 3.
Identifying the end of the current, relatively
minor eruptive episode or the possible precursors
of a much more explosive activity poses other
major challenges. In particular, as seismic records
constitute the dominant volcano-monitoring data
for Popocatépetl and most other active volcanoes,
it is crucial to better understand the empirical
relationships between the seismic signals recorded
since 1994 and the nature and vigor of the
observed volcanic activity preceding, during, and
following the seismicity. Physical models then
can be developed to explain the source of the
diverse seismic signals. Such method is inherently
non-unique, and in some cases the ambiguity of
the possible causes may lead to inadequate or even
incorrect assessment of the hazards. Reduction of
such levels of non-uniqueness based on integral
analysis of different types of geophysical and
geochemical data is a critical need to be fulﬁlled in
the future with additional data and more diag-
nostic analytical methodologies. In the mean-
while, however, some pragmatic actions must be
implemented. That it is why the Popocatépetl
Scientiﬁc Committee, in attempting to reduce
such a complex problem, has strongly emphasized
the consensual approach in its deliberations. In a
broader context, experience gained over recent
decades at volcanoes worldwide indicates a
sobering reality: despite the considerable advan-
ces in volcano-monitoring techniques, except for
Table 1 Grouping of the 19 known historical eruptions of Popocatépetl volcano (De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling 2008)
into six long-duration episodes involving successive dome-emplacements and dome-destruction explosions,
interspersed with long periods of quiescence
Period Estimated minimum
duration (y)
Estimated lapse until next
episode (y)
VEI range of eruptions in the
period
1512–1548 36 23 2–3
1571–1592 21 50 2
1642–1665 23 32 2–3
1697–1720 23 199 1–2
1919–1927 8 67 2
1994-present >20 ? 2–3
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very rare exceptions, current state-of-the-art vol-
canology still lacks a routine, reliable capability to
always correctly interpret a volcano’s precursory
signals and to accurately predict the outcomes of
volcano unrest (e.g., Tilling 2014).
Maintaining a continuous flow of up-to-date
information to the public about volcanic activity,
hazards, and risk reduction seems to be the best and
most practical solution to minimize the weariness
and indifference that at times develop among the
authorities and populations at risk during lulls of
visible activity. In this regard, the daily posting of
the activity reports of Popocatépetl on the
CENAPED website (http://www.cenapred.gob.
mx/reportesVolcan/BuscarReportesVolcan?opt
Busqueda=1) apparently has been quite effective.
This, together with the exponentially growing
influence of ﬁxed webcam sites and social media
networks, has greatly increased public awareness
of the occurrence of even minor events at Popo-
catépetl and other volcanoes in Mexico or
elsewhere. Nonetheless, we recognize that the
influence of user-generated social media reporting
needs to be regarded with caution, because there is
no assurance of the accuracy of the content of the
transmitted information. Although most reports
and comments diffused via social media are gen-
erally informative, at times scientiﬁcally unsup-
ported remarks and predictions are also included,
thereby contributing to possible confusion and
generating a negative impact on the general
awareness. To deal with this problem, SINAPROC
opened a twitter account to spread reliable infor-
mation. Dealing with modern-day modes of
information dissemination poses another major
challenge for all those involved in themanagement
of volcanic risk.
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Fig. 9 Front pages of the Puebla City news media
announcing the raise in alert level to Yellow Phase 3 in the
VTLAS. This phase requires having emergency shelters
ready (upper right), and CP personnel mobilized to carry
out a possible evacuation (lower right)
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